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Introduction  
In many states, teacher shortages have led to greater opportunities for teachers to join the 
workforce without an in-state teaching education. Before the teaching shortage, most teachers 
were prepared through undergraduate programs in Education that gave teacher certifications 
upon completion of the program. Most teachers were taught in the state that they planned on 
teaching in, this allowed for preparation of teachers on specific education standards. Programs, 
such as Teach for America, have brought many non-traditional teachers into the teaching 
profession in response to the teacher shortage. Another recently developed type of teacher prep is 
labeled lateral or alternative entry, which enables to concurrently complete requirements for their 
teaching certification while teaching in schools. Finally, states have opened their schools to 
teachers who are licensed and educated in other states. These new teacher certification programs, 
along with the desperate need for more effective teachers, has brought these lateral/alternative 
entry programs into greater prevalence among states. States with a greater need for teachers will 
draw more teachers in from alternative entry pathways as well as other states and states with a 
surplus of teachers will send their newly graduated teachers out to other states where getting a 
job is nearly assured because of the teacher drought. Along with uneven teacher supply, there is 
also the extreme variance in teacher pensions across states and age groups. Teaching is not a 
highly paid profession, so the allure for many to become a teacher is the pension program. 
Teacher’s pensions cover a percentage of their final salary for the rest of their lives, their 
Defined Benefit programs give teachers access to better retirement options and an option for 
retirement at a reasonably young age. This paper will analyze the effect of the pension generosity 
of an out-of-state teacher’s state of origin on their likelihood leave the North Carolina public 
school system.  
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Reciprocal teacher certification licensing agreements through national accreditation and 
certification associations, the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education or 
National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and Certification, allow for greater 
interstate mobility of the teacher’s labor market. The teacher labor market until recently had 
created a reasonably significant barrier for individuals to move between states, which caused a 
surplus in some states and a shortage in others. Although opening up the markets to allow for 
mobility has begun to reduce the teacher shortage in some areas, the new mobility of teachers 
has also brought to the forefront research on how out-of-state teachers function in their adopted 
state’s schools.8 In studies on teacher effectiveness, it was found that out-of-state teachers are 
less effective than both alternative entry and in-state teachers (Bastian & Henry, 2015). 
Furthermore, it was found that out-of-state teachers are also more likely to leave the labor force 
in their first three years, and the most likely to turnover within their first year of teaching 
compared to all other types of teachers (Redding & Henry, 2018).  
Teacher Distribution by State of Origin 
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North Carolina is one of many states that face teacher shortages such that 25% of their 
teaching positions are filled by out-of-state and alternate-entry individuals (Baskin & Henry, 
2015). There has been new research on the impacts of out-of-state teachers on effectiveness and 
turnover, but a lack of research into reasons why out-of-state teachers tend to turnover more 
frequently than their in-state counterparts. Studies have found that teachers who turnover often 
return to their states of origin and teach when they return (Boyd et Al., 2005). With this 
knowledge, we can address the following questions: 
• Which states-of-origin see the largest number of turnovers? 
• Using a measure for the generosity of pensions on a state by state basis, do states with 
more generous benefits draw more teachers away from the state where they begin 
teaching?  
Teacher quality and turnover has a major effect on student achievement, both teachers who 
leave their schools mid-year see negative effects on not only the achievement of the students in 
that classroom but on the students in classrooms across the school (Redding & Henry, 2018). 
The pension effects of teachers are particularly important because of the lasting effects of 
education on the earnings of students. It is critical that the effects of state pension programs on 
teacher turnover be examined in greater detail to begin to offer better policy proposals to reform 
the teacher pension program (Backes et al., 2016).  
Background 
 
Teacher pension programs are unique: they are one of the last havens for defined benefits 
plans, which are generally more generous than defined contribution plans. A defined benefit plan 
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gives a yearly allowance to a teacher that is defined when they sign their contract. For most 
teacher pension plans the equation for their benefit is  
B=M*YOS*FAS 
In the above equation, B represents the total annual benefit, M is the pension multiplier, YOS 
annotates the years of service, and the FAS is the final average salary. Depending on the state 
there may also be cost of living adjustments and the plan may be adjusted for inflation.  
Within the pension program, there are also vesting years, as more teachers retire, the 
required vesting period for most states has risen. Vesting periods are the amount of time that a 
teacher must work before they become eligible to collect pension once they reach the 
requirements for retirement or early retirement. It takes between 3-10 years for a teacher to 
become vested; North Carolina has a four-year vesting period, which is short in comparison to 
most states. Vesting periods do not transfer between states, which incentivizes most teachers to 
remain in the original state they began teaching in, or to transfer early in their career because the 
amount of money paid towards pension during the vesting period remains with the departing 
state’s retirement system. The retirement age for teachers varies between states and is generally 
anywhere between 58-67 depending on years of service. There are plans that offer early 
retirement in almost every state – excluding Alabama, District of Columbia and, Massachusetts – 
which gives the teacher the option to retire at an earlier age or lesser amount of service in 
exchange for a smaller multiplier. Many plans depend on a mix of work and service years to 
define when a teacher can receive full benefits without a penalty in their multiplier with rules 
that define the age and years of service necessary for full benefits or with rules such the rule-of-
90 in Virginia, Vermont, and Idaho. Other states have similar plans.  
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The other style of pension plan that is more popular in the private sector is the Defined 
Contribution plan. Defined Contribution plans link a teacher’s benefits directly to their 
contributions and the contributions of their employer. Some states have begun to offer hybrid 
Defined Contribution/Defined Benefit plans, but most states remain on strictly Defined Benefit 
plans.  
This paper assumes that a utility maximization theory can be applied to the turnover 
decision of teachers. This says that teachers will make a rational decision to leave their current 
position teaching in North Carolina if the decision will lead to greater compensation, including 
retirement benefits, or long-term utility to the individual. This decision should depend on a 
weighing of salary, pension benefits, non-monetary benefits (such as health care), and 
geographical location, that affect the cost of living.  
Prior Research on Teacher Pensions and Turnover 
 
In the past several years there has been an increasing amount of research comparing the 
different qualities of different teacher entry pathways, on the effectiveness of the teachers, their 
perceived preparedness and their attrition rate. A few articles have examined the impact of out-
of-state teachers on their students, but these articles have generally failed to examine the reasons 
behind the unique effects of out-of-state teachers. Although pension plans vary dramatically 
between states, they have yet to be a topic of systematic examination but the findings from 
earlier papers should be able to inform some potential effects of pensions on out-of-state 
teachers.   
First, teachers who are from out-of-state are generally less effective and more likely to 
turn over within their first five years. Out-of-state teachers feel less prepared than their in-state 
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counterparts (Hammond, Chung & Frelow, 2002). Certified teachers generally feel a greater 
sense of obligation to their students. It is unknown how the effects of attending school in the 
state where one teaches may affect a sense of preparedness, teachers with more experience being 
a classroom aid in the state of their program generally felt better prepared to (Hammond, Chung 
& Frelow, 2002). Not only do out-of-state teachers generally feel less prepared, but they are also 
less effective than both in-state teachers and alternative entry pathways, that do not receive a 
certification to teach by their first year (Bastian & Henry, 2015). The first three years of teaching 
show the greatest jumps in teacher effectiveness, but even after five years, out-of-state teachers 
are less effective than either of their counterparts (Bastian & Henry, 2015, Henry, Bastian & 
Fortner, 2011). Teachers who score poorly on their evaluations, or are ineffective are also more 
likely to leave in the middle of the year, much like teachers who feel less of a connection to their 
students (Redding & Henry, 2018, Hammond, Chung & Frelow, 2002). Within year attrition is a 
serious issue in schools specifically because it leaves students without a teacher, generally 
requiring either a short- or long-term substitute teacher which forces students to adapt to new 
teaching styles and practices as well as brings a teacher from outside the school into a new 
environment where they have little to no prior relationships with students or teachers. When a 
teacher leaves mid-year, students generally see a 7.5% standard deviation lower testing score 
than students whose teacher remains the entire year (Henry & Redding, 2018). Even when 
teachers leave at the end of the year, the year leading up to their exit the school generally sees a 
significant decrease in their effectiveness (Redding & Henry, 2018, Henry, Bastian & Fortner, 
2011). Although many of these studies have focused on the different effects of in-state and in-
school impacts on teacher turnover, they have focused on the push factors, not what might pull 
the out-of-state teacher to return to their state of origin. This study will focus on the different 
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features of pension plans that might incentivize a teacher to leave North Carolina in favor of 
returning to their state of origin. 
Teacher attrition tends to affect low-income schools the most because they have much 
higher rates of new teachers, who are more likely to turnover than their more experienced 
coworkers. Nevertheless, new teachers make up approximately 25% of the teacher workforce 
making studies into what causes them to leave critically important to finding solutions to the 
teacher shortage (Redding & Henry, 2018, Ingersoll & Merrill, 2010, Bastian & Henry, 2015). 
One of the biggest financial rewards for teachers is their pension program. Although there is 
some debate about how much a teacher values their pension plan when choosing a position, it 
does give teachers access to a relatively generous retirement fund (Backs et al., 2016, Podgursky 
et al., 2018. The pension plans vary from state to state, from what types of pension plans are 
offered to the vesting period and the transfer options. Teacher benefits have been dropping for 
newer teachers, who face longer vesting periods and fewer benefits (Podgursky et al., 2018).  
Pension plans are increasingly underfunded either due to underfunding by the State or 
overestimating returns from investments (Backs et al., 2016). Funding the plans relies on 
incoming teachers, half of new teachers will not remain long enough to receive benefits from 
their pension plans –vesting plans tend to take 1 to 10 years- and even those who remain long 
enough have most of their pay into their pension program go to older teacher’s due to low asset-
to-liability ratios (Backs et al., 2016, Podgursky et al., 2018).  
Teacher pensions offer a unique ability to predict pension benefits. The researcher has an 
insight into both the final salary and the years of service that a teacher is likely to complete. 
While this amount of data is hard to find in other professions, teacher pension benefits can be 
predicted with a fair amount of accuracy (Ni & Podgursky, 2016). In a study on the effects of 
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teacher pension changes on teacher turnover, Shawn Ni and Michael Podgursky found that 
teachers will be less likely to turnover if the pension programs change from a Defined Benefit 
policy to a Defined Contribution policy. Defined Benefit policies tend to incentivize teachers to 
drop out after they reach retirement age, the money that they make by continuing to work is 
worth less than the money they would receive from the pension program (Backes et al., 2016). 
The defined benefit system means that after retirement age a teacher who continues teaching will 
be paying more into the retirement system than they would receive if they just received their 
pension payments. This means that teachers with greater experience are incentivized to retire or 
lose resources, only a few teachers choose to continue after retirement age. Defined Contribution 
plans tend to favor a smoother benefit accrual, it also allows teachers to have greater control over 
their own pension program. Although Ni and Podgursky offer one of the few studies specifically 
focusing on the effect of pension plans on teacher turnover they focus their study on only one 
state’s pension program and ignore the effects of mobility of the teacher workforce on turnover. 
As the mobility of the teacher workforce grows, the impacts of various pension benefits, such as 
the generosity of pensions, the vesting periods, and the access to early retirement, need to be 
tested as well to judge the impact of specific pension offerings on teacher attrition. With out-of-
state teachers having access to greater mobility between states, their response to different 
pension effects should offer a look into the effectiveness of the incentives that programs have to 
offer.  
Data and Sample 
 
The data set for this study uses out-of-state North Carolina Public School (NCPS) 
teachers over their first five years of teaching. If the teacher continues teaching at their school, 
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moves to a different North Carolina school, or leaves North Carolina teaching altogether they are 
separated into different categories. A total of 30,730 teachers from NCPS are included in this 
study who are in their first five years of teaching from 2012 to 2016 and are not from North 
Carolina. About 20% of all NCPS teachers left teaching and only 0.76% of all of these teachers 
attended school in North Carolina, none have a North Carolina teaching license. Although the 
study does not include the home-state of each teacher, this study uses the state the teacher 
received their bachelor’s degree is being used as a proxy for the state-of-origin because the state 
code was reported for 30,499 of these teachers. This assumes that most teachers attend an 
undergraduate program in their home state. In their first five years of teaching, teachers have 
been found more likely to leave teaching, so only teachers in their first five years were included. 
The pension measurement uses a multiplier, the final salary, and the years of service 
(YOS) to create a scale for the pension benefits potentially received by each teacher if they 
returned to their home state. To connect each teacher to their potential benefit, each teacher is 
matched with their home state, the home state’s pension multiplier, and their age is used to 
calculate the number of years they would work before being eligible for pension benefits, then 
using these parameters assigning each teacher a potential value for their pension benefits. Along 
with the generosity measurement for each state, other pension information is included in the 
regression analysis. This includes the contribution rate of the employee, the length of the vesting 
period, and the potential for early retirement. Some states had multiple values for the multiplier 
or the contribution rate, in these cases the highest possible multiplier value and the lowest 
contribution rate was used. These were used to simulate the best possible benefits that could be 
awarded to a retiring teacher if they return to their home state. This assumption is based on both 
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the idea that the individual will attempt to maximize their benefit and to allow the teacher to see 
the greatest possible impact of pension benefits.  
Each teacher is matched with a pension value that would maximize their own personal 
benefit. For each pension program, there is a steep drop in dollar gain once an individual reaches 
retirement age, this means that to calculate the maximum benefit awarded to each teacher their 
earliest possible retirement date must be calculated. Each state has a variety of guidelines that 
dictate the earliest possible retirement age and years of service, using these guidelines, age 
brackets were assigned to each teacher to calculate the years of service (YOS) each teacher 
would serve until they were eligible to retire with full benefits, maximizing their personal benefit 
from the pension program, see appendix (Table 2). The calculation of YOS by age is then used to 
calculate the pension benefit each teacher would receive. The calculated benefits then are used in 
the regression to test if the generosity of the pension plan affects the likelihood that the teacher 
leaves NCPS.  
If teachers are using a long-term, utility maximizing decision-making process they are 
likely to return to their state-of-origin if that state has a more generous pension. More recent 
economic theory has suggested that the value of long-term benefits is viewed as discounted, 
worth less, because of the long-term payoff. If truly rational decision making is playing into the 
turnover decision-making process, teachers will return to their state-of-origin if their pension 
generosity is higher and the employee contribution rate is lower than North Carolina’s. The 
vesting period is unlikely to cause a significant effect on the likelihood to turnover due to the fact 
that young teachers, like most teacher in their first 5 years, will have to work significantly longer 
than the vesting years to reach retirement age or years of service. 
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Modeling 
 
This paper uses logistical regression modeling to test the difference between the value of 
pension benefits and the likelihood to turnover. For this paper, the likelihood that a teacher turns 
over is treated as equally likely during the first five years, and the pension value is calculated for 
each teacher each year based on their age at the end of the year. For the purposes of this paper 
the educator has two options at the end of the year, leave NCPS or continue teaching, the 
assumed value of leaving teaching in North Carolina is captured by the potential pension values, 
and the value in staying in the pension they would receive as a North Carolina teacher. 
 Equation 1 is a reduced form of the equation for the estimation of pension benefit effect. 
𝑌𝑖𝑠 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠 
where 
𝑌𝑖𝑠 is the variable for leaving NCPS teaching, coded 1 for leaving and 0 for staying, for teacher i 
in state s 
𝐵𝑖𝑠 is the awarded potential pension benefit if the teacher left North Carolina teaching in favor of 
returning to their home state to teach for teacher i in state s 
𝑉𝑠 is the amount of time necessary for teacher i in state s to become vested in the pension 
program 
𝐶𝑖𝑠 is the required contribution amount from the salary required from teacher i in state s 
𝑇𝑖𝑠 is a vector that represents the individual characteristics for teacher i in state s 
𝑆𝑖𝑠 are the school characteristics for teacher i in state s 
𝑒𝑖𝑠 is the error term specific to teacher i in state s 
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Teacher Covariates  School Covariates  
Only Out-of-State Licensure  Urbanicity 
Advanced Teacher Education  School Performance Composite 
Years of Teaching Experience Title One School Indicator 
Age School FRPM Rate 
EVAAS Mean Score School Minority Rate 
NCEES Mean Score Short Term Suspension Rate 
Gender School Violent Acts Rate 
Ethnicity 
Race Per Pupil Expenditure 
  School Novice Teacher Rate 
 
The covariates include the individual and school characteristics that influence the 
likelihood of a teacher turning over. The individual data controls both for differences in 
educational and personal experiences as well as for the experiences in the classroom, as captured 
by their Education Value-Added Assessment Score (EVAAS) and North Carolina Educator 
Effectiveness System(NCEES) scores. The school variables capture common school stressors 
such as urbanicity of their school, the monetary resources available to the school and the student 
characteristics for each school.  
For teacher covariates, out-of-state licensure only as well as their education ratio both 
relate to their labor mobility. The out-of-state licensure is a descriptive variable for teachers who 
may have been educated in North Carolina but received their teacher licensure outside of the 
state.  Teachers with out-of-state licensure have the ability to return to the state that they have 
licensure and having higher degrees, whether inside or outside the education track, would allow 
for greater mobility. Teacher EVAAS and NCEES scores are related to teacher effectiveness, 
these can affect both if teachers feel successful in their job or potentially are fired by their school 
for low effectiveness (Redding & Henry, 2018, Darling-Hammond, Chung & Frelow, 2002). 
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Schools characteristics such as the ones listed in the table above are related to the conditions that 
teachers work in. In schools with low student expenditures and high expulsion rates teachers 
generally find it harder to work at and try to leave these schools for schools with more support 
for both students and teachers, or leave the profession all together (Boyd et al., 2005, Donitsa-
Schmidt& Zuzovsky, 2016, Lindqvist, Nordänger & Carlsson, 2014). 
Findings 
 
 The purpose of this study was the determine the effects of pension generosity on the 
likelihood that a teacher leaves the NCPS system. In reporting the results, the statistical 
significance (𝛼 < 0.05) was used to judge the relevant finding in comparison to other variables 
run while testing (Table 3). The main findings are listed below: 
1. The generosity of the potential pension along with the vesting and contribution rates were 
not found to be statistically significant. 
Pension Benefits 
 
The pension variable did not have a statistically significant effect on the turnover 
likelihood at the α<0.05 but had a P-Value of 0.058 making it very close.  This coefficient shows 
that higher pension benefits in the state-of-origin might actually reduce teacher turnover slightly. 
This could be because the pension benefit calculations do not take into consideration the cost of 
living in each district that they return to, meaning some pensions may seem higher in dollar-
value but are lower when measured in real terms. This also might be because the pension system 
is very unclear for both teachers in the system and those who are thinking about moving states. 
There could also be a greater competition for jobs in states with more generous pensions, making 
it difficult for teachers to return to their states-of-origin. Finally, there could be a negative 
relationship simply because pension payouts are not highly valued by teachers when changing 
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states. The importance that teachers place on pension benefits is hotly contested in education 
literature, although it is a unique and generous benefit offered to teachers, the long-term payoff is 
often not at the forefront of teachers’ calculations about new jobs (Ni & Podgursky, 2016). 
Vesting  
 
The vesting period was not found to have a statistically significant effect (p=0.273), 
which is likely an effect of the age of the teachers. Teachers at the end of their fourth year would 
be vested in the North Carolina system, but not in most states. For young teachers, the effect of a 
vesting period would be minimal because it is the number of years that they would work to 
become eligible for full benefits. 
Contribution 
 
Contribution rates have the most impact on day-to-day activities of teachers because they 
come directly from the teacher’s paycheck, even with little concern for the future payout of the 
pension benefits, the contribution rate was expected to have a negative effect on the likelihood 
that a teacher turns over. 
Conclusion  
 
Policy discussions over teacher turnover have focused on the school and individual 
characteristics that may lead one to be more likely to turn over but excludes a systematic 
investigation of interstate push and pull factors for the most part. This paper sought to test the 
importance of one interstate factor, pension benefits, on interstate movement in an attempt to 
discern what pension options tend to pull teachers away from ‘training ground’ states like North 
Carolina and back towards their home states. This paper discovered that pension generosity, 
vesting periods and employee contribution rates do not have statistically significant effects. This 
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has many possible implications for future pension policy discussions. Most significantly, it 
shows that just increasing the generosity of pensions will not necessarily bring more teachers to 
states in need, nor keep teachers in North Carolina. The lack of substantial effect of pension 
options suggests the potential that the pension information available to teachers is lacking in a 
way that would not allow them to make well-educated choices, which would undermine the basic 
economic assumptions of utility maximization, explaining why more potential pension benefits 
would not correlate to more teacher turnover.  
It also suggests that there are other driving factors for teachers to leave North Carolina 
teaching, many of these have been studied and supported such as the resources both in 
mentorship and monetary resources, there are also personal traits that make one more likely to 
turn over, such as degrees in subjects other than teacher education or being prepared in programs 
other than traditional in-state teaching programs. There is also likely to be a personal effect, a 
desire to return to the home-state where friends and family may be located. Finally, there is the 
effect of teaching for a couple of years in a state that has a teaching shortage, where finding a job 
is easier, and returning to the home-state with a few years of experience to apply to job openings. 
This last effect causes a cyclical issue for both the home-state and the shortage state.  
There needs to be a simplification of the pension program for teachers to be able to make 
informed pension decisions. With a complicated pension system, states also lose the ability to 
use the pension program to offer more generous plans as a recruitment benefit. The current years 
of service and age requirements are complicated and often redundant which makes planning for 
the future almost impossible, as well as often might lead teachers to work past their earliest 
retirement date, which benefits the pension system and the state's deficit but reduces the benefits 
to teachers who are still working. Each state should better simplify their Defined Benefit plan or 
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switch to a Defined Contribution plan, which provides the most clarity because teachers will 
only receive the amount placed in the pension account by themselves and their employer alone 
with interest, making the benefit amount clear to both the employer and the employee.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: 
  
Observations Mean Min Max 
Left NC Teaching 30,730 0.2018549 0 1 
State of BA 30,499 33.63799 1 56 
Generosity of Benefits 30,435 36245.7 2813.22 75001.88 
Vesting 30,445 8.062572 3 10 
Contribution Rate 30,445 0.0681077 0.01 0.03 
Only Out-of-State Licensure 30,730 0.0076147 0 1 
Teacher Education 30,730 4.385877 4 7 
Years of Teaching 
Experience 
30,730 2.250602 0 5 
Age 30,730 31.47322 1 78 
EVAAS Mean Score 17,364 -0.044949 -14.80687 16.32 
NCEES Mean Score 26,544 3.401842 1 5 
Urbanicity 30,730 2.283697 1 4 
School Performance 
Composite 
30,485 57.23292 6 100 
Title One 30,730 0.4889684 0 1 
School FRPM Rate 30,701 56.65837 0 100 
School Minority Rate 30,730 55.58452 0 100 
Short Term Suspension Rate 30,730 16.25314 0 371 
School Violent Acts Rate 30,717 6.68439 0 190 
Per Pupil Expenditure 30,730 82.12358 0 422.0884 
School Novice Teacher Rate 30,730 0.2639156 0 1 
Gender 30,734 0.7946899 0 1 
Black 30,734 0.0607145 0 1 
Hispanic 30,734 0.0212468 0 1 
Asian 30,734 0.009566 0 1 
Other Ethnicity/Race 30,734 0.0137633 0 1 
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Table 2: 
State State 
Code 
Equations 
Alabama AL YOS=10 if age ≥ 52 
YOS=10+(52-age) if age < 52 
Alaska AK -- 
Arkansas AR YOS=5 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=5+(55-age) if 32 < age < 55 
YOS=28 if age ≤ 32 
American Samoa AS -- 
Arizona AZ YOS=1 if age ≥ 64 
YOS=1+(64-age) if 55 < age ≤ 64 
YOS=10 if 52 < age ≤ 55 
YOS=10+(52-age) if 37 < age ≤ 52 
YOS=25 if 35 < age ≤ 37 
YOS=25+(35-age) if 30 < age ≤ 35 
YOS=30 if age ≤ 30 
California CA YOS=5 if age ≥ 62 
YOS=5+(62-age) if age < 62 
Colorado CO YOS=35 if age ≤ 53 
YOS=(88-age) if age > 53 
Connecticut CT YOS=5 if age ≥ 40 
YOS=20+(40-age) if 25 < age < 40 
YOS=35 if age ≤ 25 
District of 
Columbia 
DC YOS=5 if age ≥ 57 
YOS=5+(57-age) if 40 ≤ age < 57 
YOS=20+(40-age) if 30 ≤ age < 40 
YOS=30 if age < 30 
Delaware DE YOS=10 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=10+(55-age) if 45 < age ≤ 55 
YOS=20 if 40 < age ≤ 45 
YOS=20+(40-age) if 30 < age ≤ 40 
YOS=30 if age ≤ 30 
Florida FL YOS=8 if age ≥ 57 
YOS=8+(57-age) if age < 57 
Georgia GA YOS=10 if age ≥ 45 
YOS=10+(45-age) if 25 ≤ age < 45 
YOS=30 if age < 25 
Guam GU -- 
Hawaii HI YOS=10 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=10+(55-age) if 35 ≤ age < 55 
YOS=30 if age < 35 
Iowa IA YOS=7 if age ≥ 58 
YOS=7+(58-age) if 40 < age < 58 
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YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if age ≤ 40 
Idaho ID YOS=5 if age ≥ 60 
YOS=5+(60-age) if 40 < age < 60 
YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if age ≤ 40 
Illinois IL YOS=10 if age ≥ 57 
YOS=10+(57-age) if age < 57 
Indiana IN YOS=10 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=10+(55-age) if 30 ≤ age < 55 
YOS=29+((30-age)/2) if age < 30 
Kansas KS YOS=5 if age ≥ 60 
YOS=5+(60-age) if 35 ≤ age < 60 
YOS=30 if 30 ≤ age < 35 
YOS=30+(30-age) if age < 30 
Kentucky KY YOS=5 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=5+(55-age) if 33 ≤ age < 55 
YOS=27 if age < 33 
Louisiana LA YOS=5 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=5+(55-age) if age < 55 
Massachusetts MA YOS=10 if age ≥ 50 
YOS=10+(50-age) if age < 50 
Maryland MD YOS=10 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=10+(55-age) if 40 ≤ age < 55 
YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if age < 40 
Maine ME YOS=1 if age ≥ 64 
YOS=1+(64-age) if age < 64 
Michigan MI YOS=10 if age ≥ 50 
YOS=10+(50-age) if age < 50 
Minnesota MN YOS=3 if age ≥ 63 
YOS=3+(63-age) if age < 63 
Missouri MO YOS=5 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=5+(55-age) if 40 ≤ age < 55 
YOS=20+((40-age)/2) if 20 ≤ age < 40 
YOS=30 if age < 20 
Northern Marianas MP -- 
Mississippi MS YOS=8 if age ≥ 57 
YOS=8+(57-age) if 35 ≤ age < 57 
YOS=30 if age < 35 
Montana MT YOS=5 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=5+(55-age) if 35 ≤ age < 55 
YOS=25 if age < 35 
North Carolina NC YOS=10 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=10+(55-age) if 40 < age ≤ 55 
YOS=25 if 35 < age ≤ 40 
YOS=25+(35-age) if 30 < age ≤ 35 
YOS=30 if age ≤ 30 
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North Dakota ND YOS=5 if age ≥ 60 
YOS=5+(60-age) if 40 < age ≤ 60 
YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if 30 < age ≤ 40 
YOS=30+(30-age) if age ≤ 30 
Nebraska NE YOS=1 if age ≥ 64 
YOS=1+(64-age) if 45 < age ≤ 64 
YOS=20+((45-age)/2) if 25 < age ≤ 45 
YOS=30+(25-age) if age ≤ 25 
New Hampshire NH YOS=1 if age ≥ 64 
YOS=1+(64-age) if age < 64 
New Jersey  NJ YOS=10 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=10+(55-age) if age < 55 
New Mexico NM YOS=5 if age ≥ 62 
YOS=5+(62-age) if 55 < age ≤ 62 
YOS=12+((55-age)/2) if 37 < age ≤ 55 
YOS=30 if 25 < age ≤ 37 
YOS=30+(25-age) if age ≤ 25 
Nevada NV YOS=5 if age ≥ 60 
YOS=5+(60-age) if 55 < age ≤ 60 
YOS=10 if 52 < age ≤ 55 
YOS=10+(52-age) if 32 < age ≤ 52 
YOS=30 if age ≤ 32 
New York NY YOS=10 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=10+(55-age) if 40 < age ≤ 55 
YOS=25 if 35 < age ≤ 40 
YOS=25+(35-age) if 30 < age ≤ 35 
YOS=30 if age ≤ 30 
Ohio OH YOS=5 if age ≥ 60 
YOS=5+(60-age) if 30 < age ≤ 60 
YOS=35 if 25 < age ≤ 30 
YOS=35+(25-age) if age ≤ 25 
Oklahoma OK YOS=5 if age ≥ 60 
YOS=5+(60-age) if age < 60 
Oregon OR YOS=5 if age ≥ 60 
YOS=5+(60-age) if 35 < age ≤ 60 
YOS=35 if 28 < age ≤ 35 
YOS=35+(25-age) if age ≤ 28 
Pennsylvania PA YOS=3 if age ≥ 62 
YOS=3+(62-age) if 30 ≤ age < 62 
YOS=35+((30-age)/2) if age < 30 
Puerto Rico PR -- 
Rhode Island RI YOS=5 if age ≥ 57 
YOS=5+(57-age) if age < 57 
South Carolina SC YOS=8 if age ≥ 57 
YOS=8+(57-age) if 40 ≤ age < 57 
YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if age < 40 
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South Dakota SD YOS=3 if age ≥ 62 
YOS=3+(62-age) if 40 < age ≤ 62 
YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if 25 < age ≤ 40 
YOS=35+(25-age) if age ≤ 25 
Tennessee TN YOS=5 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=5+(55-age) if 30 ≤ age < 55 
YOS=30 if age < 30 
Texas TX YOS=5 if age ≥ 60 
YOS=5+(60-age) if 50 < age ≤ 60 
YOS=15+((40-age)/2) if 40 < age ≤ 50 
YOS=20+(40-age) if age ≤ 40 
Utah UT YOS=4 if age ≥ 61 
YOS=4+(61-age) if 30 ≤ age < 61 
YOS=35 if age < 30 
Virginia VA YOS=5 if age ≥ 57 
YOS=5+(57-age) if 34 ≤ age < 57 
YOS=28+((34-age)/2) if age < 34 
Virgin Islands VI -- 
Vermont VT YOS=5 if age ≥ 60 
YOS=5+(60-age) if 40 ≤ age < 60 
YOS=25+((40-age)/2) if age < 40 
Washington WA YOS=5 if age ≥ 60 
YOS=10 if 55 < age ≤ 60 
YOS=11+(55-age) if 44 < age ≤ 55 
YOS=10+(44-age) if age ≤ 44 
Wisconsin WI YOS=5 if age ≥ 60 
YOS=5+(60-age) if 35 < age ≤ 60 
YOS=30 if 27 < age ≤ 35 
YOS=30+(57-age) if age ≤ 27 
West Virginia WV YOS=5 if age ≥ 55 
YOS=5+(55-age) if 30 < age ≤ 55 
YOS=30 if 25 < age ≤ 30 
YOS=30+(25-age) if 20 < age ≤ 25 
YOS=35 if age ≤ 20 
Wyoming WY YOS=4 if age ≥ 61 
YOS=4+(61-age) if 45 ≤ age < 61 
YOS=20+((45-age)/2) if age < 45 
 
 
Table 3:  
Odds Ratio P-Value 
Generosity of Benefits 0.9999953 0.058 
Vesting 0.987441 0.299 
Contribution Rate 3.084215 0.136 
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Only Out-of-State Licensure 0.1851565 0.000 
Teacher Education Ratio 1.004595 0.923 
Years of Teaching Experience 1.045473 0.003 
Age 0.9784618 0.000 
EVAAS Mean Score 0.9771979 0.013 
NCEES Mean Score 0.7765498 0.000 
Urbanicity 1.070399 0.000 
School Performance Composite 0.9953837 0.014 
Title One 1.144056 0.033 
School FRPM Rate 0.9970282 0.077 
School Minority Rate 1.003689 0.015 
Short Term Suspension Rate 1.001428 0.288 
School Violent Acts Rate 1.000349 0.918 
Per Pupil Expenditure 0.993241 0.657 
School Novice Teacher Rate 1.660527 0.016 
Gender 1.081452 0.175 
Black  0.8779327 0.197 
Hispanic  1.127893 0.486 
Asian 1.294369 0.297 
Other Ethnicity/Race 1.322661 0.436 
 
n=16,075  
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